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Private Pension Protections since ERISA:
The Expanded Role of the Individual
KAREN A. ZURLO
Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
School of Social Work
Designed to provide security and equity to defined benefit (DB)
pension plans, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) became law in 1974. Since that time, the economy has
shifted to a more globalized, non-unionized, service-based en-
vironment, where defined contribution (DC) plans replaced
DB plans as the dominant type of private pension plan. Today
workers and retirees bear the burden of managing their pension
plans and the associated risks. To protect Americans against
the financial risks they face in retirement and ensure greater
economic security in old age, targeted financial education, re-
search, and fundamental pension policy reform are required.
Key words: pensions, ERISA, retirement income, individual re-
sponsibility, financial education
Primary government programs, namely Social Security
and Medicare, face significant shortfalls. Social Security, for
example, faces a long-term financial imbalance (Munnell, 2011).
Fewer workers will finance the retirement of the growing baby
boom generation, yielding a system of benefits and current tax
rates that are not sustainable in the future. Medicare, too, is at
risk of not sustaining the current level of health insurance it
provides adults. Between 1996 and 2005 out-of-pocket medical
expenses increased by 39.4 percent (Paez, Zhao, & Hwang,
2009), a trend that is likely to continue. As a result, the role of
private pensions is heightened, requiring private pensions to
contribute larger amounts to retirement income. Nevertheless,
the private pension landscape has shifted in ways that may
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result in lower private pension wealth for retirees (Kapinos,
2009).
Private pensions have experienced profound change over
the past forty years. Firms have shifted from the provision of
defined benefit (DB) plans, where the employer bore the eco-
nomic and demographic risk (Scahill, 1999), to defined contri-
bution (DC) plans. Although the American welfare state is pre-
mised on a mix of private, tax-subsidized benefits, that pattern
is being undermined as firms shift to providing 401(k) plans
and reduce the benefits they provide employees (Peters, 2005).
The transition from DB to DC plans has placed a premium on
participants' decision-making competencies (Clark & Strauss,
2008). Today individuals must take more fiscal responsibility
for their pension plans and retirement income, yet many are
not equipped with the knowledge to manage this responsibil-
ity. This lack of knowledge can have a profound effect on re-
tirement income and public and private policies, as they relate
to administering private pension income to America's older
adults. The erosion of employee pension benefits will have far-
reaching effects, potentially decreasing retirement income and
increasing poverty levels in old age.
Historical Development of Private Pensions
The Social Security Act and its Amendments were precur-
sors to the large-scale development of private pension plans
and prompted the growth of private pensions in the United
States. Between 1940 and 1945 the number of pension plans
grew dramatically. In 1940, 1,530 private pensions existed; this
grew to a total of 6,700 in 1945, covering 6.5 million employees
(Ippolito, 1997). This positive growth was due to changes in
tax policy, the stabilization of wages during World War II and
the Korean War, and actions of the War Labor Board (WLB)
(Ippolito, 1997).
To finance World War II, Congress increased the top corpo-
rate and individual tax rates; six percent of the nation paid tax
in 1939, which increased to nearly seventy-five percent by 1945
(Sass, 1997). As a result, tax sheltering became an important
concern to the more highly compensated employees (Koff &
Park, 1999). Additionally, the Revenue Act of 1942 regulated
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tax incentives by tightening requirements for the qualification
of pension plans and improving the tax advantage for quali-
fied plans, which included no capitations on pensions paid by
tax-exempt trusts, no vesting requirements, and the regulation
of pension costing and funding (Sass, 1997).
The war experience demonstrated the usefulness of the
pension as a compensatory instrument (Sass, 1997), where the
deferred nature of the compensation would enhance employee
loyalty to the company. As tax rates decreased and wage flex-
ibility returned after 1945, the private pension emerged in the
post-war era as a widely recognized management tool (Sass,
1997).
Labor, too, played a significant role in the development of
pensions. Although organized labor's main interest in private
pensions did not begin until after World War II, two main
forces were instrumental in its development (Hacker, 2002).
Unions, namely The United Auto Workers (UAW), put private
pensions and welfare benefits at the center of their bargain-
ing drives. These organizations embraced fringe benefits, spe-
cifically private pensions, in their negotiations with employ-
ers because they saw them as effective tools in their battle
for benefits (Hacker, 2002). Second, the Federal government
pushed pensions onto the bargaining table as a means to resist
demands to increase public social insurance (Ippolito, 1997). In
support of labor's efforts, in 1949 the Supreme Court approved
a National Labor Relations Board ruling that pensions were a
legitimate issue to use in collective bargaining (Hudson, 2005).
From 1950 to 1960 the largest employers, namely manufac-
turers, dominated the pension plan expansion. Over this same
period the number of plans increased dramatically, as did the
proportion of workers covered, which grew from 12 percent to
33 percent between 1940 and 1960 (Sass, 1997). Yet, during the
1950s, complaints surfaced about losses of employee pension
benefits. For those who retired early, the requirements of age
and service were barriers to their receipt of pension benefits
(Hudson, 2005).
Growing evidence of fraud, embezzlement, and the mis-
management of investment pension funds exacerbated these
problems, and Congress responded by enacting the Federal
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 (PL 85-836),
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which was significantly amended in 1962 (McGill, Brown,
Haley, Schieber, & Warshawsky, 2010). A weak component of
the legislation was that plan participants had prime respon-
sibility for monitoring pension plan activity. The individual
plan participants were expected to spot fraud and criminal
activity and the legislation provided them with a way to seek
relief from the wrongdoing (McGill et al., 2010). This was a risk
for participants because few were knowledgeable of pension
plan activity and, for the most part, they had neither the time
nor interest in this responsibility. Additionally, there were a
number of gaps in corporate pension plans, such as the ability
of a corporation to default on its obligations (Sass, 1997). These
gaps alerted policymakers to the need for a new approach to
retirement security. Although there were several attempts to
regulate and oversee aspects of the private pension system
prior to 1974, none were as comprehensive as ERISA.
ERISA
While the number of workers covered by private pensions
increased through the 1960s and the burden of detecting fraud
and criminal activity shifted from the plan participant to the
Departments of Labor and Justice, individual participants had
inadequate protections (Hacker, 2002). The most prominent
issues that fostered the design of ERISA were defaults, namely
that of the Studebaker Company, and abuses that became
public as a result of the Studebaker collapse (Wooten, 2001,
2004).
The Studebaker-Packard Corporation (Studebaker) col-
lapse, a prime focusing event (Wooten, 2001), created the
impetus for moving private pension legislation forward. At
the time, Studebaker was a large automotive manufacturing
company in Indiana. Known as a model welfare capitalist firm,
it had a negotiated contract signed by the UAW Union (Klein,
2003). Although the UAW union was a champion of conserva-
tive funding and investing, the Studebaker pension plan did
not have the assets required to redeem all the benefits that
were promised (Sass, 1997). The pension plan was millions
of dollars short and 7,000 workers received little or nothing
from the company (Klein, 2003). Moreover, there was rigorous
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competition from Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler
Corporation, the Big Three automakers, at the time. As a result,
Studebaker closed its South Bend, Indiana plant on November
1, 1964 and terminated its labor contract one month later (Sass,
1997).
Based on the fall of Studebaker in 1964, a number of abuses
in pension plan structure became public and prompted future
legislation. Unreasonably high vesting thresholds prevented
long-time workers from qualifying for benefits (Wooten, 2004).
Also, pension rules defined "unbroken" service in narrow terms.
For example, if a worker was re-assigned to a job with a differ-
ent classification, this was considered a break in service and
adversely affected the worker's pension benefit. Additionally,
courts upheld practices of employers by reserving their rights
to modify, decrease, or deny benefits or eliminate pensions
at will (Sass, 1997). Employers avoided a number of liabili-
ties by asserting in plan documents that workers were claim-
ing benefits against the plan, and not against the assets of the
corporation (Klein, 2003). Due to these abuses, the Studebaker
shutdown became a catalyst for reform and prompted future
legislation (Wooten, 2001).
Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) to eliminate abuses through greater federal regu-
lation and guarantees (Klein, 2003). Additionally, the UAW
pension specialists devised a remedy that became a precur-
sor to Title IV of ERISA, the termination insurance program
(Wooten, 2001). The remedy moved default risk (risk that a
pension plan will terminate without enough funds to meet its
obligations) (Wooten, 2001) and termination insurance onto
the legislative agenda and stimulated the enactment of private
pension legislation, ERISA. This effort took ten years to come
to fruition.
The ERISA legislation originated as a Presidential initiative
under Kennedy in 1963. Although Johnson pursued the draft-
ing of the ERISA legislation, the labor movement and leading
business groups were hostile to it, so the process came to an
abrupt halt (Hacker, 2002). Nixon's administration countered
the reform agenda, but with his resignation legislators were
eager to prove to the American people that the political process
was not broken. As a result, ERISA legislation was processed
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expeditiously. It passed in the House on August 20, 1974, in
the Senate on August 22, 1974 and was signed by the newly
installed president, Gerald R. Ford, on Labor Day, September
2, 1974 (Sass, 1997).
Although its creation was a lengthy process, ERISA was
designed to redress regulatory shortcomings that deprived
employees of old-age retirement income security (Ledolter &
Power, 1984). Among its many provisions and amendments,
ERISA's over-riding purpose remains the provision of secu-
rity and equity to the retirement income of private-sector em-
ployees (Altman & Marmor, 1988). As the first comprehensive
legislation regulating many aspects of private pensions and
savings plans, ERISA was the product of four congressional
committees: the House Ways and Means Committee, the House
Labor Committee, the Senate Labor Committee, and the Senate
Finance Committee, which are members of the Departments
of Labor and the Treasury (Scahill, 1999). ERISA's objectives
were:
e to ensure that workers and beneficiaries receive
adequate information about their employee benefit
plans;
* to set standards of conduct for those managing
employee benefit plans and plan funds;
9 to determine that adequate funds are set aside to pay
promised pension benefits;
e to ensure that workers receive pension benefits after
they have satisfied certain minimum requirements; and
* to safeguard pension benefits for workers whose
pension plans are terminated. (Coleman, 1989, p. 3)
The successes of ERISA are noteworthy; benefit security
and fiduciary responsibility have improved, as has funding
for poorly managed funds (Scahill, 1999). As a result, between
1975 and 2005 there was a significant increase in total number
of pension plans, number of participants, as well as in the fi-
nancial assets of private pension funds. More retirees and em-
ployees are participating in pension plans than ever before.
Through the ERISA legislation, employers are required to
adhere to guidelines that did not exist prior to 1974.
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Pension Eligibility, Participation,
and the Termination of Plans
For pension plans to operate fairly and effectively, ERISA
requires certain criteria to be met. For example, to participate
in a private pension plan, an employee must be eligible. The
term 'eligibility' refers to the conditions an employee must
meet before being covered by a pension plan; these conditions
generally involve attaining a minimum age and completing a
minimum period of service with an employer (Coleman, 1989).
ERISA does not set these minimums; it only requires that these
criteria are set in advance, are clearly communicated to partici-
pants, and are not arbitrarily changed by the employer (Sass,
1997).
Pension contributions begin to accrue as soon as an em-
ployee satisfies eligibility requirements and becomes a par-
ticipant in a pension plan. Yet, no legal right to receive any
benefits from those contributions exists until an employee
becomes vested (Coleman, 1989). Vesting periods are waiting
periods before rights to benefits can be exercised (Crystal &
Shea, 2003). These periods are established by employers and
can range from five to fifteen years. Once vested, an employ-
ee "owns" the right to receive a retirement benefit from that
plan when retired; in most cases, this right is maintained even
if they leave that employer (Coleman, 1989). If an employee
leaves a company before vesting, they forfeit any right to a
benefit upon retirement.
Benefits accrue differently in defined benefit (DB) and
defined contribution (DC) plans. In DB plans, once an em-
ployee is a participant, the employee begins to accrue a spe-
cific amount of money each year toward a monthly retirement
benefit (Coleman, 1989), which is invested by the employer.
The amount accrued each year is based on a formula applied
to salary and years of service. The employee gains a legal right
to the accruals, when vested, but does not actually receive the
benefit until the agreed-upon retirement period time is reached.
In a DC plan, the participant's accrued benefit is the balance in
an individual's account and is invested and managed by the
participant.
In 1974, at the time of the implementation of ERISA,
three Federal agencies were made responsible for its
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administration: the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC), the Department of the Treasury, including the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Department of Labor's
Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA). While the
latter two are responsible for DB and DC benefit plans, includ-
ing 401(k) plans, the PBGC guarantees benefits of DB plans
only. The PBGC was designed to reduce the risk of pension
forfeiture by mandating that all firms participate in a common
insurance pool (Hacker, 2002). This governmental underwrit-
ing of private pension risk marked a novel departure for the
federal government in the pension field (Hacker, 2002).
The PBGC is a tax-exempt, self-financed, independent
corporation, whose income comes from premiums paid by
private pension plans that are subject to termination insurance
(Coleman, 1989). It provides plan termination insurance ensur-
ing employees are paid at least part of their benefits upon ter-
mination of a plan. Additionally, it is liable for the payment of
all guaranteed or insured benefits in single-employer benefit
plans. The PBGC also provides loans to financially troubled
multi-employer pension plans (Coleman, 1989). The PBGC re-
ceives no funds from general tax revenue, and its obligations
are not backed by the credit of the U.S. government (Sass, 1997).
Its operations are funded by the insurance premiums, assets
from pension plans trusteed to PBGC, investment income,
and recoveries from companies responsible for trusteed plans
(Sass, 1997).
Today the PBGC insures the pensions of 44 million workers
in more than 27,000 private sector DB pension plans (U. S.
Government Accountability Office, 2011a). Yet, during the past
decade, the PBGC has come under pressure. There has been
an unprecedented number of pension plan terminations with
substantial levels of underfunding. A number of insolvent pen-
sions, predominantly in the airline industry, were turned over
to the PBGC in the early 2000s, which assumed the pensions'
liabilities. In 2004 the PBGC posted its largest shortfall in the
agency's 30-year history. Losses from completed and probable
pension plan terminations totaled $14.7 billion for the year (U.
S. Government Accountability Office, 2011a). At the end of
fiscal year 2010, the PBGC's net accumulated financial deficit
was $23 billion (U. S. Government Accountability Office,
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2011a). As a result, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) placed the PBGC's single-employer program on its list
of 'high risk' government programs in need of immediate at-
tention in July, 2003 and added the multiemployer program
to the list in January, 2009 (U. S. Government Accountability
Office, 2011a). Today each program faces increased risk due to
the steep downturn in the financial markets (U. S. Government
Accountability Office, 2011a).
Operation of Private Pension Plans
In 2004, 51 percent of all workers in the United States
between the ages of 21 and 64 participated in an employer-
sponsored private pension plan (Munnell & Perun, 2006). In
addition to an employee's level of income, participation in em-
ployer-sponsored plans depends on the size of the employer,
employment status (e.g., full-time or part-time), age, union
status, tenure, and industry. Until recently, employers offered
retirement benefits because of Federal income tax advantages,
the anticipated reduction in employee turnover, and as a re-
tirement incentive for older employees (Ippolito, 1997), cre-
ating powerful financial incentives that influence individual
work and retirement decisions of employees and employers.
As a form of deferred income, private pensions are admin-
istered as DB and DC plans. The employer, who makes pre-tax
contributions into a pension fund for all participants, funds
the DB plan. Participants typically do not make contributions.
Plan contributions are held in a trust on behalf of all partici-
pants, where contributions are subject to federal funding rules
and regulations. In this type of pension plan, the employer
owns the assets in the fund, directs the investments, and bears
the risk (Gale, Papke, & VanDerhei, 2005). A DB plan provides
income that commences after an employee retires; this is con-
sidered a guaranteed annuity.
As long as the employer's financial health is strong, the ful-
fillment of retirement income is probable through a DB plan.
However, when businesses encounter financial difficulty, the
promise is at-risk. Since this risk jeopardizes retiree's incomes,
employers are required to pre-fund DB pension plans. Through
the ERISA legislation, the PBGC guarantees the benefits within
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limits and charges insurance premiums to the plans, which
are intended to cover the agency's expected costs (Gale et al.,
2005).
In contrast to a DB plan, a DC plan provides an employee
with an individual account in which the benefit provided con-
sists of contributions made by the employee and the employer,
and includes any investment earnings gained. The employer's
contributions are based on a pre-determined formula; most
often the employee and the employer contributions are placed
in an individual account on behalf of the participant. It is then
the responsibility of the participant to manage the investment,
and as a result, the employee bears the risk of the fluctuating
asset values (Gale et al., 2005). A DC plan is not subject to the
termination insurance program (PBGC), hence the individual
bears the risk of the plan.
Figure 1. Number of Private Pension Plans by Type (1975-2005)
[E 08 Plans U DC Plans 1
Source: U.S. Department of Labor (2011) (Table El)
A hybrid of a DB and DC plan also exists and is known as a
cash balance plan. Cash balance plans, introduced by Bank of
America in the early 1980s, are DB plans that look and feel like
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DC plans, where the basic benefit is provided as a lump-sum,
and not as an annuity (McGill et al., 2010). An annual alloca-
tion is provided to the participant's account as a percentage
of pay; these accounts grow through a rate established by a
predetermined formula (McGill et al, 2010). Schieber (2005) re-
ported that hybrid plans are preferable for younger and more
mobile workers.
Figure 2. Number of Private Pension Plan Participants by Type, in
thousands (1975-2005)
E- DB Plans U DCPlans
Source: U.S. Department of Labor (2011) (Table ES)
As Figures 1 and 2 indicate, since the enactment of ERISA in
1974, the number of pension plans and participants in pension
plans grew dramatically. The total number of DB and DC plans
grew from 311,100 in 1975 to 680,000 in 2005, where DC plans
accounted for the majority of the growth. In 1975, 66.8 percent
of all plans were DC plans, whereas in 2005, 93 percent of all
plans were DC plans. New plan formations in recent years
have been small, with the total of single-employer private
plans increasing by about 1 percent, where new plan creations
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were offset by terminations and mergers (U. S. Government
Accountability Office, 2011b). These trends are noteworthy
because of their implications for workers and retirees.
In addition, there has been a significant increase in the
total number of plan participants. In 1975, approximately 44.5
million individuals participated in a private pension plan; this
increased to 117 million in 2005 (U. S. Department of Labor,
2011), a 163 percent increase in the number of participants.
Similar to the growth in the number of DC plans, the number
of DC plan participants also grew more than DB plan partici-
pants. In 1975, 26 percent of the total participants were in DC
plans; whereas in 2005, 64 percent were in DC plans (U. S.
Department of Labor, 2011).
Corporations that replaced DB plans with DC plans pre-
dominantly responded to a dynamic economic and political
environment. DB plans initially evolved with the growth of the
manufacturing sector in the United States. Essentially, large
firms and unionized work forces bargained for these plans. But
as the economy shifted to a more non-unionized, service-based
environment, DC plans proliferated. Moreover, government
regulation is known to be more onerous on DB plans than on
DC plans. The PBGC requires firms offering DB plans to pay
premiums to maintain insurance; the regulations for DB plans
impose a complicated set of funding rules, limitations, and
regulations pertaining to pension investment (Clark, Craig, &
Wilson, 2003). As a result, shifts in union status, firm size, and
regulations explain much of the trend toward DC plans.
Employees gained control of their retirement benefits
through the proliferation of DC plans. They then had the ability
to manage their individual retirement accounts, contribute to
them, and take the accounts with them when they left their
employers. With the advent of 401(K) plans, the predominant
type of DC plan, workers gained the ability to direct their own
investments. Employees were offered the ability to make tax-
deductible employee contributions, making this investment
vehicle quite attractive (Brown, 2008).
Yet, the pension landscape was not secure for retirees
during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Funding rules were weak
and premiums for plans covered by the PBGC were not ad-
equate. Additionally, some employers began manipulating DB
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pension plan benefits to serve corporate profitability and did
not adequately provide the retirement security that workers
expected. This trend is documented by Schultz (2011), who
claimed that in the 1990s corporations used a variety of ac-
counting techniques, tax incentives, and other forms of ma-
nipulation to syphon money from pension plans and serve
corporate purposes. She provides an example called the "ac-
counting effect," where a company could reduce benefits by
hundreds of millions of dollars and record the change as a
profit. This practice benefited corporate executives, who were
compensated by reaching certain profit targets, and sharehold-
ers, but in many cases workers and retirees, subjected to this
deception and fraud, were cheated out of retirement income.
Many workers did not realize they were victimized until the
DB plans went into default and were turned over to the PBGC.
The Pension Protection Act of 2006
The underfunding of pension plans continued to threat-
en firms' abilities to pay retirees their pensions (Campbell,
Dhaliwal, & Schwartz, 2010). Pension defaults threatened the
fiscal viability of the PBGC. In 2005, when United Airlines
became the largest pension default in U.S. history, pension
legislation regained its prominence in Congress. In response
to the pension crisis, Congress adopted the Pension Protection
Act of 2006 (PPA), which is a comprehensive piece of legisla-
tion. Initiated as PL 109-280, the PPA passed the House by a
vote of 279-131 on July 28, 2006. The Senate voted 93 to 5 to
approve the bill on August 3 and the legislation was signed
into law on August, 17, 2006 by President George W. Bush.
The PPA provided major revisions to the DB pension
system, DC qualified plans, individual retirement accounts,
and annuities (Landsberg, 2008). Silver-Malyska and Jenkins
(2006) claimed that the focus of the law was to increase funding
for DB plans through stricter fund requirements and limits on
benefit increases and lump-sum distributions. The PPA made
significant changes to the rules governing DC plans as well,
specifically provisions that encourage automatic enrollment.
The GAO (US Government Accountability Office, 2011b)
reported:
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In order to encourage greater participation by
employees with access to an employer-sponsored
pension plan, provisions of the Pension Protection Act
of 2006 facilitated the adoption of automatic enrollment
policies in DC plans by providing incentives for
doing so and by protecting plans from fiduciary and
legal liability if certain conditions are met. With such
policies, new hires and existing employees who are not
contributing to their 401(k) plan would be automatically
enrolled and contributing unless they affirmatively
take action to stop those contributions. (p. 9)
Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) show that
in 2008 about 53 percent of private-sector wage and salary
workers, aged 25 - 64, worked for employers that sponsored a
retirement plan, and about 44 percent participated in a plan (US
Government Accountability Office, 2011b). Because the CPS
does not ask respondents about the type of pension plan, the
data reflect both DC and DB plans. Yet, in DB plans, coverage
and participation are synonymous, whereas in DC plans par-
ticipation is voluntary, resulting in varying rates of coverage
and participation (Purcell, 2004). The automatic 401(k), which
harnesses the power of inertia by setting the default option at
each phase of the 401(k) saving cycle, is designed to improve
retirement security for millions of workers without requiring
them to become financial experts (Gale, lwry, & Walters, 2009).
In sum, although the PPA made progress in improving the
PBGC program and in providing automatic enrollment to em-
ployees, it did not fully correct the firms' failures to fund their
pension obligations adequately. Since the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (2011a) designated single-employer and
multiemployer DB pension plans as high-risk in 2003 and 2009,
respectively, the financial position of the PBGC remains poor.
Additionally, today half of the workforce lacks access to any
employer plan, requiring these individuals to rely on savings
and Social Security in retirement. These issues remain a chal-
lenge. Between worries about insolvency of Social Security, the
substantial underfunding of public, state, and local pension
plans, high profile losses in 401(k) plans at firms like Enron, the
impact of the recent economic recession, and the fact that the
PBGC had an accumulated deficit of $23 million in September,
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2010, more than double the deficit of two years earlier (U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 2011a), public confidence
in the nation's retirement system is low (Brown, 2008).
Expanded Role of the Individual
The GAO reported that over the last three decades, DC
plans have replaced DB plans as the dominant type of private-
sector employer pension plan and, by almost any measure,
have taken on a primary role in how workers save for retire-
ment (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011b). By 2007
(the most recent year with available data), DC plans comprised
93.1% of all plans and active DC participants in the private
sector outnumbered those in DB plans 66.9 million to 19.4
million (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011b).
Table 1: Life Expectancy at Birth, 1970 - 2007, and Projected Life
Expectancy, 2010 - 2020
Year Total Male Female
1970 70.8 67.1 74.7
1980 73.7 70.0 77.4
1990 75.4 71.8 78.8
2000 76.8 74.1 79.3
2007 77.9 75.4 80.4
2010 (Projected) 78.3 75.7 80.8
2015 (Projected) 78.9 76.4 81.4
2020 (Projected) 79.5 77.1 81.9
Source: Xu, Kochanek, Murphy, & Tejada-Vera, 2010
By participating in a DC plan, individuals enjoy the ben-
efits and flexibility of saving for retirement. DC plans provide
lump-sum payments; they offer workers more liquidity before
and during retirement, and they are portable, which means
that workers can take their individual funds with them when
they leave their company (Hacker, 2002). This type of dis-
bursement is appealing to many employees and employers,
but may present a challenge to an employee or retiree who is
unfamiliar with the concepts of amortization and life expec-
tancy, and lacks knowledge about investment options and the
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associated tax implications. Ideally, it is in the best interest of the
employee and retiree to invest this lump-sum so it will last
through the retirement years. If an individual does not have
this knowledge or foresight, the DC participant essentially
faces the risk of outliving his or her pension income. In light
of existing and projected increasing life expectancies (Table
1), outliving one's income is possible for many older men and
women. In addition to the benefits accrued by participating in
a DC plan, there are risks.
The recent economic recession created significant financial
losses for many Americans. Not only did the decline in equity
values decrease 401(k) accounts by 30%, many Americans lost
their jobs, corporations suspended their 401(k) matches, and
hardship withdrawals from 401(k) accounts ticked upward
(Munnell, Kopcke, Golub-Sass, & Muldoon, 2009). Based on
these recent developments, income from a DC pension plan is
likely to be less than anticipated. In addition, there has been an
overall decline in plan coverage and participation between 2000
and 2008 (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011b). And
among those who participate in a plan, mistakes are made in
the management of their accounts (Munnell & Sunden, 2004).
Over half fail to diversify their investments, many over-invest
in company stock, and almost none re-balance their portfoli-
os in response to their age or market returns (Munnell, 2006).
Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus, and Yamaguchi (2006) found that
most workers with DC plans are inattentive portfolio manag-
ers and are characterized by inertia. The declining prevalence
of DB pensions that provided a guaranteed lifelong income
have put much of the responsibility for preparing for retire-
ment directly on workers (Purcell, 2009), yet there is little evi-
dence that supports the notion that workers are equipped to
handle this responsibility.
In order to make informed financial decisions about
issues such as financial entitlements, pension plans, insurance
matters, investment strategies, budgeting, and health care
(Mackell, 2008; Skinner, 2007), Americans must be financially
educated and learn to view themselves as individually respon-
sible for their financial well-being. Those who lack financial
literacy are less likely to plan for retirement, are more likely to
be poor in retirement, are less likely to invest in stocks, and are
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more likely to accumulate expensive debt (Lusardi & Mitchell,
2008). Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a, 2007b) also found that
financial literacy is not widespread among older Americans.
Only half of the respondents aged 50 and over could correct-
ly answer questions about compound interest and inflation.
Additionally, women displayed much lower levels of financial
literacy, raising concerns about the ability of older women to
make sound saving and investment decisions related to their
retirement (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2008).
Discussion
As the first wave of baby boomers turns 65 years of age
in 2011, governmental agencies, researchers and policy makers
are at a pivotal crossroad. ERISA and the PPA promised greater
economic security to employees and private pension retirees.
Although these promises may have been met early in the ERISA
and PPA life-cycles, pension policy of the past decades has
reduced the retirement security of the baby boom generation
and is not capable of delivering the necessary pension protec-
tions of today's economic environment. Economic uncertainty,
increased globalization, an increased non-unionized work-
force, and longer life expectancies for men and women neces-
sitate further change in the pension system. Baby boomers will
be the first generation to have spent their whole careers under
the regulated retirement system that exists today (Schieber,
2005), where there has been a transfer of fiscal responsibility
from employers to pension plan participants. As a result, we
must work to minimize financial risks older Americans will
face in retirement. Following are a few practice, policy, and re-
search considerations.
Because financial literacy is associated with retirement
planning and planning has a positive relationship with retire-
ment savings (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007b), offering targeted
financial education programs is critical, specifically among mi-
norities and women, who face the greatest economic risk in
retirement. It is unlikely that men and women will spend the
time and money needed to develop the financial knowledge
necessary to make informed investment decisions (Schulz,
Rosenman, & Rix, 1999). Hence, workers should be trained
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and educated about financial issues while in the workplace
(Kim, 2008). In a study of benefit administrators at 212 corpo-
rations, Volpe, Chen, and Liu (2006) recommended that future
educational programs focus on retirement planning and the
basics of personal finance because employees have inadequate
knowledge in these two areas. The positive impact of finan-
cial knowledge extends beyond retirement planning (Hira &
Loibl, 2005), and is known to benefit the employer and em-
ployee through increased levels of productivity and decreased
absenteeism (Kim & Garman, 2003). In addition to offering tar-
geted financial education programs, comprehensive research
that evaluates existing programs is needed, focusing on the
long-term effects of participants' financial well-being among
the diverse array of workforce populations (Kim, 2008).
Moreover, we face a major challenge understanding the re-
lationship between behaviors and economic decision-making.
The field of behavioral economics, combining research from
psychology and economics, offers a unique area of develop-
ing knowledge that can help us better understand the motives,
acts, thoughts, and feelings behind the behaviors related to
participating in pension plans. Developing a common lan-
guage and framework to promote interdisciplinary research
and an exchange of knowledge (Heckman, 2011) in these two
fields is recommended.
Additionally, there are a number of areas where pension
policy reform is required. One area pertains to the retirement
savings behaviors of individuals. For example, automatic en-
rollment plans and lifecycle balancing plans (Mitchell et al.,
2006) anticipated increased levels of retirement savings, but
they have not realized their intended impact. Tergesen (2011)
reported that the total amount put into 401(k) plans increased
by 13 percent since 2006, but the average savings rate has fallen
in recent years. Additionally, some employers have not yet
offered their employees the auto-enrollment feature because of
the cost of the employer match to the organization. Life-cycle
balancing plans, which balance risk and return for investors
using a pre-determined time horizon, have not yet produced
their intended results either. Many investors do not participate
in these types of plans. Consequently, revised pension policy
correcting these unintended consequences is needed.
Private Pension Protections
Because the increased administration cost associated with
government regulations exceeded the tax advantage of pension
saving for workers at lower pay levels in small employers,
many small employers terminated their DB plans over the
past two decades (McGill et al., 2010). This has resulted in low
participation rates for low-income workers. Congress should
consider the implications of their past pension policies and
promote pension policies with lower administration costs so
smaller employers can offer attractive pension plans to all em-
ployees, specifically, low-income workers. Moreover, tighter
federal regulations are needed to control the retirement system
that has been abused by corporations, who siphoned money
from pension plans to serve corporate purposes. These execu-
tives managed the system for their own benefit at the expense
of the retirement security of employees and retirees.
An additional policy recommendation pertains to
strengthening the PBGC. Similar to legislation introduced by
Senator Kohl (D-WI) in 2009, entitled The PBGC Governance
Improvement Act of 2009 (S. 1544), future legislation is required
to strengthen the limitations of the PBGC, specifically its struc-
ture and practices. The proposed legislation of 2009 amended
ERISA by revising the composition and duties of the Board of
Directors of the PBGC and requested that the Board form audit
and investment committees to improve their effectiveness and
establish a risk management position. If this type of legisla-
tion is enhanced, re-introduced, and ultimately becomes law,
the improved functioning of the PBGC would be one positive
step toward providing better protection to millions of workers
participating in DB plans.
Policy initiatives that respond to the current economic
environment, which is similar to the economic period when
DB plans were first introduced, will be beneficial also. Federal
policy that promotes the growth of pension plans with DB
characteristics, including DB-DC hybrids, the DB(k) plan, and
traditional multiemployer portable DB plans that are common
among mobile workforces (Ghilarducci, 2006) may offer viable
alternatives to employees and employers. For example, in
DB-DC plans, employees and employers contribute to the plan,
but the employee does not have the responsibility for manag-
ing it (Munnell & Quinby, 2009). In fact, in the Netherlands,
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where collective risk-sharing is preferred to individual inves-
tor autonomy, hybrid pension plans (also known as "average-
wage" schemes) have evolved, which effectively balance risk
among employers, employees, and retirees and help maintain
social solidarity among its citizens (Ponds & van Riel, 2007).
The economic environment has changed drastically over
the past 40 years. The role of private pension plans is height-
ened because of the financial shortfalls facing Social Security
and Medicare. Public policy has had a huge impact on pensions
in the past and could provide greater security in the future.
Legislation that protects the financial interests of workers and
programs that increase financial knowledge among workers
and retirees will provide a critical path toward ensuring fi-
nancial well-being in late life. Additionally, pension policy
should guard against financial risks and promote participation
so workers of all income levels have an incentive to partici-
pate in a private pension plan. Pension reforms that improve
retirement security are needed. By fixing the private pension
system, confidence in the nation's retirement system will be
restored.
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